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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
where the promisee reasonably relies on the oral contract and injustice
would otherwise result, assertion of the equitable estoppel doctrine
should be allowed. Section 217A, however, apparently has been adopted
by only one state to date. 5
While the Minnesota Supreme Court has consistently required a
representation or concealment of material facts as a prerequisite to
applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel, dictum in Sacred Heart
indicates that it may, in a proper case, take a contract out of the Statute
of Frauds in the absence of a representation or concealment of mate-
rial facts if there is sufficient detrimental reliance." While arguments
can be made for doing this and thereby relaxing the current requirement
of conduct "akin to fraud," injustice has not resulted from the standard
as applied in Minnesota to date and the consistent application of a well-
defined standard has much merit. A case may arise where a change in
standards is required, but the facts of Del Hayes and Sacred Heart did
not give rise to the equities necessary to justify such a change. Thus, the
court properly held that the facts of Del Hayes and Sacred Heart were
insufficient to establish equitable estoppel. The mere breach of an oral
agreement, which probably occured in both cases and which the jury
found in Sacred Heart, is insufficient to establish equitable estoppel."
Some reliance by a party will arise from any oral contract, and if that
reliance were enough to establish equitable estoppel, the Statute of
Frauds would be rendered meaningless."8
Commercial Law-THE U.C.C. AND DISCLAIMER OF CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES-Cambern v. Hubbling, - Minn. -, 238 N.W.2d 622
(1976); Kleven v. Geigy Agricultural Chemicals, 303 Minn. 320, 227
N.W.2d 566 (1975).
In two recent cases involving agricultural losses, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court was required to determine the validity of disclaimers of
consequential damages under the Uniform Commercial Code, and to
35. McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Hawaii 29, 469 P.2d 177 (1970), noted in Annot., 54
A.L.R.3d 707 (1974). For a discussion of this case and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTuCTS § 217A (Supp. Tent. Draft No. 4, 1969), see Note, The Doctrine of Estoppel
Gains a Foothold Against the Statute of Frauds, 1 CAP. U.L. REv. 205 (1972). The 1973
version of section 217A is substantially the same as the 1969 version.
36. The court stated: "We are mindful that the situation may arise where the character
and magnitude of the detrimental reliance of the party seeking an equitable estoppel may
be so great as to require, upon equitable principles, taking a contract out of the statute of
frauds." 305 Minn. at 327-28, 232 N.W.2d at 923.
37. See, e.g., Hurst v. Thomas, 265 Ala. 398, 403, 91 So. 2d 692, 697 (1956). If it could,
the Statute of Frauds would, in effect, be nullified.
38. See Sacred Heart Farmers Coop. Elevator v. Johnson, 305 Minn. 324, 327, 232
N.W.2d 921, 923 (1975); Del Hayes & Sons, Inc. v. Mitchell, 304 Minn. 275, 284, 230
N.W.2d 588, 594 (1975).
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determine what types of losses constitute consequential damages which
are subject to such disclaimers.
In Kleven v. Geigy Agricultural Chemicals, I several farmers pur-
chased herbicide for use on their farmland. The farmers sued the
manufacturer-seller for breach of an express warranty of fitness and
merchantability because only some of their fields treated with the herbi-
cide displayed good weed control. The jury found the manufacturer had
breached the warranty and that as a direct result of this breach the
farmers sustained damages of $2,146.20 for the cost of the herbicide and
expenses incurred in applying the product. The jury also found that
consequential damages were excluded from the manufacturer's implied
warranty under a disclaimer provision. The trial court ruled that the
farmers' crop losses and tilling costs constituted consequential damages
and therefore declined to order judgment for such losses.2 The supreme
court affirmed and held that surrounding circumstances and the nature
of the product made the disclaimer reasonable and operative.'
In Cam bern v. Hub bling,4 cattle farmer-buyers made an oral contract
with a cattle raiser to purchase 179 calves. When the buyers received
the calves, they failed to read the receipt of sale, which contained a
disclaimer of consequential damages. Shortly after delivery, the calves
showed signs of illness and within the following three month period
eighty-one calves died. In an action for breach of an implied warranty
of fitness, the jury awarded the buyer $19,386.62 as damages for the cost
of the dead calves and the expenses resulting from proper treatment of
the calves. The trial court initially excluded the disclaimer as uncon-
scionable but added by memorandum that no agreement had ever
been reached between the parties to include the disclaimer in the sales
contract.' The supreme court held that the latter was the more sound
reason to exclude the disclaimer of consequential damages and that
therefore the unconscionability issue need not be met.6
1. 303 Minn. 320, 227 N.W.2d 566 (1975).
2. Id. at 321, 227 N.W.2d at 568.
3. Id. at 329, 227 N.W.2d at 572.
4. __ Minn. - , 238 N.W.2d 622 (1976).
5. Id. at -, 238 N.W.2d at 623-24.
6. Id. at , 238 N.W.2d at 624. However, the trial court deviated from the usual
measure of damages for a breach of warranty, the difference at the time and place of
acceptance between the value of the goods actually accepted and the value they would
have had if they were as warranted, contained in MINN. STAT. § 336.2-714(2) (1976). After
noting that this was not intended to be the exclusive measure of damages for a breach
of warranty, see id. at -, 238 N.W.2d at 625 n.4, the supreme court accepted the trial
court's explanation for the deviation:
Where the subject matter of the sale is a sick animal it is much more reason-
able to measure damages by the expense and result of proper treatment and to
calculate the effect of either failure or success, or both, than to base damages
on what must be a highly speculative evaluation at the time of sale when the
[Vol. 3
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In both Kleven and Cambern, the Minnesota Supreme Court faced
the issue of the enforceability of disclaimers of consequential damages
challenged as being unconscionable. A major obstacle to recovering con-
sequential damages arises where the buyer has signed a contract in
which the seller disclaims all liability for such damages. Where the
parties expressly provide for an exclusive remedy in substitution for the
damages recoverable under the Uniform Commercial Code, that remedy
normally is the buyer's sole recourse.7 The buyer, however, may attempt
to nullify the disclaimer by claiming it is unconscionable, as did the
buyers in Kleven and Cam bern. The court in Kleven found that a buyer
may rely upon either of two code sections to establish unconsciona-
bility.8 Section 2-302 allows the court to refuse to enforce a contract or
any of its provisions if necessary to avoid an unconscionable result;9 and
Section 2-719(3) permits a court to allow the normal U.C.C. remedies
where a limitation on consequential damages would be unconsciona-
ble.'
The U.C.C. does not define the term "unconscionable," but the basic
test is "whether, in the light of the general commercial background and
the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses in-
volved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances
existing at the time of the making of the contract."" In addition, a
disclaimer of consequential damages is prima facie unconscionable
when the disclaimer is for personal injuries caused by consumer goods."
By not finding the disclaimers to be unconscionable, the Minnesota
degree of response to treatment is necessarily an unknown factor.
Id. at -, 238 N.W.2d at 625.
7. See MINN. STAT. § 336.2-719(1) (1976); 2 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-719:6, :10 (1971); 3A R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, SALES AND BULK
TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 14.0912] (1976).
8. 303 Minn. at 327-28, 227 N.W.2d at 571-72.
9. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-302 (1976) provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable oppor-
tunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to
aid the court in making the determination.
10. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-719(3) (1976) provides: "Consequential damages may be lim-
ited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of conse-
quential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie
unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not."
11. U.C.C. § 2-302, comment 1 (1972 version).
12. See note 10 supra.
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court followed the trend of courts in other jurisdictions, which are reluc-
tant to utilize the unconscionability doctrine in cases not involving con-
sumer products or personal injuries. 3 Generally, in a commercial set-
ting, a contract will not be held unconscionable unless necessary to
prevent oppression or unfair surprise, 4 and the courts normally will
require a greater showing that the contract or provision works a hardship
on the party invoking the unconscionability doctrine than is required in
consumer cases.
5
Read together, Cambern and Kleven suggest that in normal commer-
cial transactions, the court will be reluctant to find a disclaimer of
consequential damages to be unconscionable. The court's treatment of
the two cases indicates it will look to at least four factors in determining
whether such a disclaimer will be enforced. First, the Kleven court
considered the nature of the product. 6 The herbicide involved was a
highly technical and specialized chemical substance designed to control
selectively certain weeds and plants in a field. An incorrect choice of the
herbicide as the solution for a farmer's particular problem would proba-
bly not produce the desired result. A manufacturer may quite reason-
ably wish to protect itself from warranty litigation, brought by dis-
appointed buyers, arising from the uninformed and unsupervised appli-
cation or use of a very technical and specialized product.
Second, the court considered the degree to which proper function of
the product, even if correctly selected to cure a particular problem,
13. See, e.g., Cryogenic Equip. Co. v. Southern Nitrogen, Inc., 490 F.2d 696, 698-99 (8th
Cir. 1974) (disclaimer upheld in commercial setting where both parties to contract were
experts and no disparity in bargaining power appeared); Cyclops Corp. v. Home Ins. Co.,
389 F. Supp. 476, 481 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (limitation in commercial contract between large
business entities not unconscionable where neither personal injury nor property damage
was involved); Royal Indem. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 520, 524-25
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (commercial setting, no showing of unequal bargaining power, and exper-
tise of both parties to contract resulted in reluctance to hold a disclaimer unconscionable);
Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 404, 244 N.E.2d 685, 688,
297 N.Y.S.2d 108, 112 (1968) (reluctance to call limitation unconscionable where sole
remedy failed of its essential purpose and could be construed as such); Schroeder v. Fageol
Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 261, 544 P.2d 20, 25 (1975) (en banc) (in purely commercial
transactions exclusionary clauses are prima facie conscionable and burden of establishing
unconscionability rests upon party attacking).
14. See generally R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 44, at 126-27 (1970).
15. Compare Bill Stremmel Motors, Inc. v. IDS Leasing Corp., 89 Nev. 414, 418-19, 514
P.2d 654, 657 (1973) and Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 261, 544 P.2d
20, 25 (1975) with Morris v. Chevrolet Motor Div., 114 Cal. Rptr. 747, 752 (Ct. App. 1974)
and Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 59 Misc. 2d 241, 242-43, 298 N.Y.S.2d 538, 539-40 (Sup.
Ct. 1969).
16. See 303 Minn. 320, 329, 227 N.W.2d 566, 572 (1975). The court took judicial notice
of the facts that the herbicide was a technical, specialized chemical used to eradicate only
certain weeds selectively and that the eventual yield of a farm crop is affected by numer-
ous factors such as soil, weather, seed, and weeds. Because of these variables, limited
favorable results could be expected by the parties.
[Vol. 3
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could be defeated by factors beyond anyone's control.'7 Increased yields,
the desired effect of the herbicide, could be affected by the condition of
the soil, weather, seed, weeds, and other uncontrollable factors.' 8 Under
such circumstances a manufacturer cannot guarantee results, and a
disclaimer of consequential damages may not be unreasonable.
Third, the Kleven court noted that the disclaimeer and the risks
presented by the first two factors had been fairly disclosed to the buyer
at the time the contract was consummated.' 9 When the existence of the
disclaimer and the risks are disclosed, at the time the bargain is struck,
to a buyer who can understand and appreciate them, the likelihood of
subsequent unfair surprise is minimized. In Cambern, existence of the
disclaimer had not been disclosed by the seller before a binding con-
tract had been entered. 0 The Cambern court, reluctant to hold a dis-
claimer in a commercial contract unconscionable, simply held that the
disclaimer was not part of the contract.
2 '
Fourth, Kleven dictum indicates that a manufacturer's refusal to
make necessary repairs or otherwise mitigate damages by replacing the
product or rescinding the contract might be considered." Whether or not
rising to the level of bad faith, such conduct may be unfair or unreason-
able when surrounded by known circumstances out of which conse-
quential damages might well arise.
In Kleven, the court faced the additional problem of determining
what types of losses constitute consequential damages under a dis-
claimer provision. 3 Under the U.C.C., the distinction between conse-
quential and direct damages is controlled by Sections 2-714 and 2-715.
Section 2-714(2)4 provides the measure of damages for a breach of war-
17. 303 Minn. at 329, 227 N.W.2d at 572.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. - Minn. at -, 238 N.W.2d at 624.
21. Id.
22. The Kleven court included in its analysis the rationale underlying MINN. STAT. §
336.2-719(1) (1976) that every sales contract must provide at least some fair remedy in
case of breach. See 303 Minn. at 327, 227 N.W.2d at 571. The court cited with approval
the Kansas case, Steele v. J.I. Case Co., 197 Kan. 554, 419 P.2d 902 (1966), in which the
seller's disclaimer of consequential damages was voided because the seller knew that his
failure to refund the purchase price or to replace farm machinery would result in a sub-
stantial crop loss to buyers. See 303 Minn. at 327-28, 227 N.W.2d at 571-72. While the
Kleven court approved the reasoning of the Kansas case, it arrived at the opposite result
because the factual situations were dissimilar.
23. See 303 Minn. at 324-27, 227 N.W.2d at 569-71. This problem, of course, was not
faced by the court in Cam bern because in that case the disclaimer provision was held to
be inoperative and therefore the court did not have to distinguish between direct and
consequential damages. Instead, the court concluded that between MINN. STAT. § 336.2-
714 (1976) and MINN. STAT. § 336.2-715 (1976) the plaintiff could recover for the losses he
suffered. See - Minn. at -, 238 N.W.2d at 624-25.
24. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-714(2) (1976) states: "The measure of damages for breach of
5
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ranty: the difference between the value of the goods at the time and
place of acceptance and the value they would have had if they had been
as warranted. This formula operates unless "special circumstances show
proximate damages of a different amount,"25 which suggests that the
buyer under Section 2-714(2) will receive either direct or consequential
damages, but not both. Section 2-714(3)," 6 however, modifies this result
by allowing the buyer in a proper case to recover, in addition to any
direct damages, incidental and consequential damages under Section 2-
715 .
2
In defining consequential damages, the U.C.C. has adopted the time-
honored rule first expressed in Hadley v. Baxendale,2s and adopted by
the Minnesota court in Paine v. Sherwood,'2 that direct damages arise
out of the breach itself, while consequential damages are those damages
arising foreseeably from the breach.30 The Kleven court referred to the
leading Minnesota case of Despatch Oven Co. v. Rauenhorst3' for assis-
tance in determining what constitutes consequential damages.32 Conse-
quential, as opposed to direct, damages were defined by the Rauenhorst
court as damages which "do not arise directly according to the usual
course of things from the breach of contract itself, but are rather those
which are the consequence of special circumstances known to or reason-
ably supposed to have been contemplated by the parties when the con-
tract was made.
33
Under the Rauenhorst test, the court in Kleven determined that only
the cost of the herbicide and expenses in its application were recoverable
warranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the
goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless
special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount."
25. Id.
26. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-714(3) (1976) provides that "[iln a proper case any incidental
and consequential damages under the next section may also be recovered."
27. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-715(1) (1976) allows recovery for incidental damages while
MINN. STAT. § 336.2-715(2) (1976) provides for consequential damages.
28. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
29. 21 Minn. 225 (1875).
30. See MINN. STAT. § 336.2-715(2) (1976).
31. 229 Minn. 436, 40 N.W.2d 73 (1949) (lost profits on sales of seed and feed corn
caused by breach of warranty as to seed corn dryer's capabilities not recoverable as
consequential damages where contract of sale exculpated seller therefrom).
32. 303 Minn. at 324, 227 N.W.2d at 569.
33. 229 Minn. 436, 445, 40 N.W.2d 73, 79. In a much earlier case, Frohreich v. Gammon,
28 Minn. 476, 11 N.W. 88 (1881), the court defined direct damages as those which arise
"from the breach itself; that is to say, from the breach purely, and irrespective of conse-
quential damages." 28 Minn. at 481, 11 N.W. at 89. Consequential damages were defined
by the Frohreich court as those which would be appropriate if "one sells and warrants a
thing for a particular use, upon reasonable ground for believing that, if put to such use, a
certain loss to the buyer will be the probable result if the warranty is untrue." Id.
[Vol. 3
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol3/iss1/11
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
as direct damages, while crop losses and tilling costs arose as a proxi-
mate result of the breach and were validly disclaimed consequential
damages. 4 This determination seems correct, but Kleven does indicate
that the theoretically simple distinction between direct and consequen-
tial damages often can be difficult to apply in practice.35 The hazy
distinction between the two types of damages does leave the court with
some flexibility, however, especially when a valid disclaimer of conse-
quential damages is involved. By categorizing a loss as being a direct
result of the breach, when it is arguably direct or consequential, the
court can allow the plaintiff additional recovery despite the disclaimer.
This flexibility may be useful to the court as a tool for balancing the
equities of the parties in disclaimer cases where the unconscionability
doctrine is not applicable.
Corporations-FIDUcIARY DUTY TO CREDITORS-Swanson v. Tomlinson
Lumber Mills, Inc., - Minn. -, 239 N.W.2d 216 (1976).
In the recent case of Swanson v. Tomlinson Lumber Mills, Inc., I the
Minnesota Supreme Court expanded the common law rule that prefer-
ences are voidable when given to a director of an insolvent corporation
to the detriment of corporate creditors.' Defendant Tomlinson was pres-
ident and a director of several corporations, including Tomlinson Lum-
ber Sales (Tomlinson Sales). He was also either the sole shareholder or
joint owner with members of his family of each of the corporations.
As president of Tomlinson Sales, Tomlinson executed promissory
notes totalling $209,126.26 to Burlington Northern, Inc. (Burlington),
payable December 31, 1970. The notes were not paid when due and
Burlington commenced suit on the notes on March 5, 1971. At that time,
the assets of Tomlinson Sales were composed almost entirely of accounts
receivable due from Tomlinson's other corporations. Tomlinson Sales
therefore was a creditor of the other Tomlinson corporations. For no
consideration, the current accounts receivable were converted by Tom-
34. 303 Minn. at 327, 227 N.W.2d at 571.
35. A comparison of two Minnesota cases suggests that the Minnesota Supreme Court
does not rely on formulas or strict definitions but responds to the particular circumstances
of each case by designing the damage recovery to meet the buyer's losses. In Barthelemy
v. Foley Elevator Co., 141 Minn. 423, 170 N.W. 513 (1919), direct damages (difference
between the value of the goods as accepted and the value of the goods if they had been as
warranted) were awarded for the failure of seed wheat to mature properly. However, in
Moorehead v. Minneapolis Seed Co., 139 Minn. 11, 165 N.W. 484 (1917), the court deter-
mined the damages where seed wheat entirely failed to germinate by using a more complex
computation involving the value of the land's use with additions (cost of seed and plant-
ing) and deductions (value of the use remaining at the time the seed failed to germinate).
1. __ Minn. -, 239 N.W.2d 216 (1976).
2. See generally 15A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§
7467-80 (rev. perm. ed. 1967).
19771
7
et al.: Commercial Law—The U.C.C. and Disclaimer of Consequential Damages
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1977
